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Abstract 
Educational classes address profound social, political, cultural and economic issues of ethnicity. The social 
teaching Program in schools includes some thematic units that introduce some important ethnic groups. These 
units include educational values and critical thinking; reading literature; culture, perception and communication; 
issues of ethnicity. In this article, we discuss the thematic unit “issues of ethnicity” in order to identify some of 
the challenges facing classes in which ethnicity is a major topic. We distinguish explicit (“old”) and implicit 
(“new”) forms of ethnic discrimination, arguing that implicit forms of ethnic discrimination require a discourse 
analytical approach to analyzing ethnicity. We believe that this approach offers provocative opportunities for 
class discussion of ethnicity and ethnic discrimination. 
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1. Introduction 
   Although the readings vary in their content and focus, they comprise a complex and well integrated set of 
readings, which, taken together, spell out key ideas about ethnicity. These ideas may be summarized as follows: 
(a) ethnic categories (e.g., Kord, lor, Fars, Balouch, Tork, Arab) do not stand up to empirical scientific 
investigation. That is, ethnic categories are inherently arbitrary, as evidenced by the fact that scientific efforts to 
establish ethnic categories result in multiple and contradictory groupings, even when genetic criteria are used. 
Indeed, ethnic differences are scientifically so unimportant that the very concept of “ethnicity” has little or no 
scientific validity. (b) Nevertheless, explicitly racist and ethnocentric programs such as the eugenics movement 
in the United States and Nazism in Germany have distorted science in order to justify repression and violence 
against racial and ethnic minorities. To undermine such movements and reduce ethnic discrimination, scientific 
education should focus on the speciousness of the concept of ethnicity. (c) Implicit in the readings is an 
understanding of ethnic discrimination as a belief system about the relative value of different ethnic groups, 
usually with “Fars” at the pinnacle of an ethnicity hierarchy. Within this perspective, anyone can be an 
ethnocentric, if they believe that one ethnic group is superior to others. (d) Viewing ethnic discrimination as a 
belief system about ethnicity places empirical evidence, logical argument, and education at the center of anti- 
ethnocentric efforts. Hence the authors appropriately focus on the scientific analysis of ethnicity. 
 
2. Literature Review 
    The related literature reveals the irrationality of racist and ethnocentric ideology by pointing out the weak 
scientific basis for the concept of ethnicity and the genetically negligible differences among races and ethnic 
groups. But the argument contains a danger in its logic: If we argue that discriminating against people on the 
basis of ethnicity is wrong because the concept of “ethnicity” does not have biological reality, does it follow that 
ethnic discrimination may be justified if ethnicity were a biologically salient category? As early as 1963, Mayr, 
one of the most important developers of contemporary ideas about evolution, aptly addressed the problem: 
Equality in spite of evident nonidentity is a somewhat sophisticated concept and requires a moral stature of 
which many individuals seem to be incapable. They rather deny human variability and equate equality with 
identity. Or they claim that the human species is exceptional in the organic world in that only morphological 
characters are controlled by genes and all other traits of the mind or character are due to “conditioning” or other 
nongenetic factors . . . An ideology based on such obviously wrong premises can only lead to disaster. Its 
championship of human equality is based on a claim of identity. As soon as it is proved that the latter does not 
exist, the support of equality is likewise lost (Mayr, 1963, p. 649). 
   Mayr’s point becomes clear if we look at gender. While biologists may consider ethnic categories to be 
scientifically irrelevant, all biologists agree that the male-female distinction is biologically salient. The 
differences between men and women are systematic, and such differences are found at genetic, biological and 
even neurological levels. Does that make sexism more reasonable than ethnic discrimination? 
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   Pinker (2002) argues that the case against ethnic discrimination and sexism is a moral stance that does not 
depend on the biological sameness of people: 
The case against bigotry is not a factual claim that humans are biologically indistinguishable. It is a moral stance 
that condemns judging an individual according to the average traits of certain groups to which the individual 
belongs. Enlightened societies choose to ignore race, sex and ethnicity in hiring, promotion, salary, school 
admissions, and the criminal justice system because the alternative is morally repugnant. Discriminating against 
people on the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity would be unfair, penalizing them for traits over which they have no 
control. It would perpetuate the injustices of the past . . . rend society into hostile factions and [it] could escalate 
into horrific persecution. But none of these arguments against discrimination depends on whether groups of 
people are or are not genetically indistinguishable (p. 145). 
   The real problem of ethnic discrimination does not lie in ethnic categories. However flimsy the concept of 
ethnicity may be, human beings continue to perceive ethnicity, although that in itself is not a problem. The 
fundamental issue is how we use ethnic categories in our social lives. It may be justifiable and beneficial for a 
forensic anthropologist to use racial or ethnic categories when identifying a decomposed corpse, but using ethnic 
categories to limit access to education or jobs is not. The key idea is that equality does not require identity, and 
differences need not and should not translate to inequality. 
   Still, debunking quasi-evolutionist ethnocentric ideology by pointing to the falsity of its claims has its own 
value. False claims made under the guise of science need to be refuted not just in science but in popular 
discourse. However, debunking a specific ideology is not sufficient for countering ethnic discrimination, because 
ethnic discrimination is, like humans, omnivorous. Extreme forms of ethnic discrimination, such as slavery, 
violence, and segregation laws, are also relatively infrequent today, and such acts are rightly recognized as 
inhumane and criminal. Yet ethnic discrimination persists, because there are always new ideologies generated to 
fuel ethnic discrimination, whose form also changes over time. Today, forced sterilization and the legal denial of 
civil rights have been replaced by new forms of racism and ethnic discrimination, called “symbolic racism,” 
“everyday racism,” or “new racism” (Barker, 1981); these forms of ethnic discrimination are supported by new, 
subtle ethnocentric ideologies. One challenge for class discussion of ethnicity and ethnic discrimination is to 
develop a framework for understanding these new ideologies and new forms of ethnic discrimination. 
   Implicit forms of ethnic discrimination often emphasize alleged aspects of minority cultures, such as reliance 
on welfare, low school achievement, drug use, violence, and affirmative action, which, it is believed, come 
together to form pathological cultures that are distinct from “mainstream” Fars culture. A central characteristic 
of these implicit forms of ethnic discrimination is that they are usually not called “ethnic discrimination” at all 
(see Barker, 1981; van Dijk, n.d.). Instead, the view of minority cultures as pathological is allegedly based on 
observation of reality and commonsense knowledge about minority groups. Sociological, linguistic and cultural 
“facts” are called upon to support such views. For example, in the latest of his controversial best-sellers, Who 
Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, Samuel Huntington (2004) offers socio-cultural 
reasons why recent Latino immigrants in the United States are (he claims) much less likely to speak English than 
European immigrants of the past: Latinos speak a common language, unlike earlier European immigrants who 
were linguistically diverse; Latinos are residentially segregated in the U.S. Southwest and a few major cities 
where Spanish is a working language; Latinos are much less interested than past immigrants in cultural 
assimilation; and Latinos are controlled by activists who encourage their cultural distinctiveness and 
maintenance of Spanish. Huntington believes that Latino immigrants’ alleged insistence on speaking Spanish is 
incompatible with the “American dream,” which he considers to be the core of American national identity: 
“There is no Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. 
Mexican-Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English” (p. 256). 
 
3. State of the Problem 
   While many social scientists (e.g. Alba, Rumbaut & Marotz, 2005) have demonstrated that the central claims 
of Huntington’s argument are in fact empirically wrong, the popularity of Huntington’s work suggests that its 
“Anglo-Protestant,” English-only ideology (which is not empirically testable) is widely held and politically 
popular. But is Huntington’s work “racist or ethnocentric”? Rather than developing from a single ideology, 
ethnic discrimination persists through different ages, feeding on whatever ideologies are available at the time. 
With the demise of explicit forms of racism like eugenics and Nazism, we need a framework for analyzing 
ethnicity and ethnic discrimination that students can use to examine work such as Huntington’s. Is such work 
ethnocentric? Why or why not? What do we mean by “ethnic discrimination”? 
   The understanding of ethnic discrimination as a belief system about an ethnic group superiority does not 
explain why ethnic discrimination persists long after societies have dismissed the idea of ethnocentric 
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superiority. Indeed, students in class discussions routinely recognize the difficulty in defining ethnic 
discrimination and in determining what constitutes ethnocentric practices. A productive direction for discussion 
of ethnicity is to focus on how ethnic discrimination is expressed, why it persists, and what its social value may 
be. These questions place discourse rather than scientific argument or empirical data at the center of attention. 
By focusing on discourse, we shift attention away from scientific facts about ethnicity to ways of “ethnicity 
practicing,” and their social implications – that are, to the content and forms of texts and talk that are produced 
and circulated in the society, and the way such communities of practicing are linked to actual social practices. 
 
4. A Discourse Analytical Approach to Ethnicity and Ethnic discrimination 
   One of the most influential theories of racist and ethnocentric discourse is that of van Dijk (1990, 1993a, 
1993b), who works within the framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA), which he prefers to call “critical 
discourse studies.” CDA does not refer to a specific method of analysis, but instead is an interdisciplinary 
academic movement of scholars who are committed to social and political activism, or who adopt a critical 
perspective toward public discourse (van Dijk, n.d.). CDA is particularly appropriate for class discussion in the 
educational system because it encourages the application of critical thinking to everyday social life by examining 
discourse in society: how discourse is produced and interpreted, and what function the discourse serves in 
society (Gee, 1999). While various methodologies are employed in CDA, an informal, qualitative discourse 
analysis does not require specific knowledge and skills. Introducing CDA by encouraging students to collect and 
critically analyze newspaper articles, selections from television and video, and other discourse data can help 
raise students’ awareness of ethnic discrimination as an ongoing social problem, not as an atrocity of the past 
that is on its way to a natural extinction. 
 
5. Key Concepts in CDA 
   If CDA is to be used in class, we must first have a basic notion of how CDA can contribute to understanding 
ethnicity and ethnic discrimination. In this section, we introduce some useful ideas from van Dijk’s general 
theoretical framework on discourse, racism or ethnic discrimination, and society. A key focus is “social 
representations” of individuals or groups as “black,” “white,” “Asian,” or other ethno-racial categories. The 
reason for calling them “social representations” is that they are shared beliefs, values, norms, attitudes, and 
ideologies that one needs to have in order to function as a competent member of society. Social representations 
influence individuals’ understanding of specific, personal experience. For example, imagine a Fars middle-class 
individual in a park in Tehran observing a mother and child walking together speaking Kurdish. This particular, 
specific event becomes part of personal experience and memory, but that experience and memory are 
fundamentally shaped by the observer’s “social knowledge” about Kurd people. In this case, the event might 
register as a case of “Kurd people holding on to Kurdish and refusing to learn or speak Persian, the language of 
Fars group.” 
   One type of social representation is stereotypes, which are a central concern of CDA. The social representation 
of Kurd people as “holding on to Kurdish and refusing to learn or speak Persian” may be considered a 
stereotype. Stereotyping is often viewed as a form of “categorization”; the difference between stereotypes and 
other categories is usually considered to be a matter of accuracy or legitimacy. In this view, categorization is a 
necessary and natural part of human cognition, but sometimes it “goes too far,” resulting in an exaggerated, 
distorted or overly negative representation (i.e., a stereotype). From this perspective, stereotypical 
representations are overly broad categories – unfortunate, but understandable, and they can be corrected through 
education and information. 
   In contrast to this view, van Dijk, like Pickering (2001), argues that stereotyping is a particular and distinctive 
form of social cognition. In everyday life, human beings use categories to understand the world and to act in it. 
Usually these categories are not fixed, but somewhat flexible; they can be modified as needed, and new 
categories can be formed on the basis of new information. Stereotypes, on the other hand, are fixed, and they 
severely limit the formation of new categories. For example, ethnic stereotypes can persist despite clear scientific 
evidence that they are false. Moreover, Pickering (2001) points out those stereotypes have certain social value 
that mere categories do not: 
Stereotyping may operate as a way of imposing a sense of order on the social world in the same way as 
categories, but with the crucial difference that stereotyping attempts to deny any flexible thinking with 
categories. It denies this in the interests of the structures of power which it upholds. It attempts to maintain these 
structures as they are, or to realign them in the face of a perceived threat. The comfort of inflexibility which 
stereotypes provide reinforces the conviction that existing relations of power are necessary and fixed (p. 3). 
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   In other words, the social function of stereotypes is that they help to maintain existing social relations. In the 
example of “Kurd people holding on to Kurdish and refusing to learn and speak Persian,” an important question 
is how this stereotype is embedded in a broad system of social inequality. From this perspective, ethnic 
discrimination is not a system of beliefs about one group’s superiority over another, but a system of group 
dominance: a system for reproducing unequal social relations that sustains the advantages and privileges of the 
dominant group. A corollary is that ethnic discrimination can only be practiced by dominant groups. Although 
some individual members of subordinate groups may espouse a belief in their own superiority, such beliefs are 
not “ethnocentric” unless they are part of a larger social system that sustains a social hierarchy in which the 
group is privileged. This perspective enables us to examine ethnic discrimination as a broad social problem that 
permeates many societies. 
   To summarize: Social groups are composed of people who share a set of representations (which may be 
competing and contradictory) and who use them as a basis for interpreting the meaning of events in life and the 
world in general (such as a mother and child speaking Kurdish or the effects of immigrants on society). These 
social representations influence how people interpret individual events, talk, and text. Ethnic discrimination is a 
system of group dominance that includes a social dimension (everyday discriminatory practices, such as school 
segregation and ethnicity profiling), as well as a cognitive dimension (such as stereotypical representations). 
   To understand the persistence of ethnic discrimination, we must ask: How are social representations 
communicated and shared? It is here that discourse becomes crucial, because discourse works as an interface that 
connects the social and the cognitive (van Dijk, 1990, 1993a). Social representations are acquired, 
communicated and reproduced through various forms of discourse, including peer talk, parent-child 
communication, classroom interaction, lectures and discussions in educational institutions, and mass media. 
Logical scientific argument is only one small component in educational discourse. In fact, not all forms of 
discourse are equally significant in their influence on social cognition. Van Dijk calls for special attention to the 
discourses produced by social elites, which are “groups in society that have special power resources [such as] 
property, income, decision control, knowledge, expertise, position, rank, as well as social and ideological 
resources such as status, prestige, fame, influence, respect, and similar resources ascribed to them by groups, 
institutions, or society at large” (1993b, p. 44). While elites may directly influence the actions of others (e.g., by 
making political decisions in government or executive decisions in a corporation), they also have significant 
power in shaping public opinion (van Dijk, 1993b). Scientists are one group of social elites, but their formal, 
written forms of scientific discourse (such as the readings about ethnicity in schools) play a relatively minor role 
in supporting or undermining ethnocentric social representations, since the reader of such texts read them only 
for passing school exams is very small compared, for example, to a national television channel which has every 
day audience. 
   Particularly influential elite discourse includes mass media and political discourse, which often overlap. 
Politicians appear frequently in the mass media, where they routinely define “problems” for others to discuss; in 
this sense, they establish social agendas. Although politicians often claim that their concerns are determined by 
average people, and indeed political talk and public opinion may have a limited reciprocal relationship, elites and 
the public are quite asymmetrical in power. What political actors say has great influence in shaping public 
opinion, as does the mass media that cover such political discourse (and more). Formal political debates, 
newspaper editorials, public speeches, and press releases are a few of the types of texts that comprise influential 
forms of elite discourse. 
   When we look at ethnicity in elite discourse, we need to keep in mind that explicit forms of ethnic 
discrimination and racism (“old racism” [van Dijk, n.d.]), such as violence, apartheid, and segregation laws, are 
rare. The explicit ethnic discrimination no longer has legitimacy in public discourse. Yet ethnic discrimination 
persists (often not termed “ethnic discrimination” at all), and is passed on (or “reproduced”) through more subtle 
forms of discourse. In other words, social representations of ethnic groups in Iran are no longer dominated by 
traditional ethnocentric representations; in their place are more subtle (and often “cultural”) stereotypes that are 
believed to be based on reality (e.g., “Kurd people hold on to Kurdish and refuse to learn and speak Persian”). 
 
6. Using Critical Discourse Analysis of Ethnicity in the Classroom 
   What are the pedagogical implications of applying CDA to ethnicity and ethnic discrimination, understanding 
ethnic discrimination not as a belief system, but as a discourse that sustains unequal social relations of power? 
Three principles can guide lesson planning within this framework: (a) Students should undertake their own 
discourse analysis by locating and analyzing ethnic stereotypes and other representations. (b) Examples of elite 
discourse are particularly appropriate for analysis, and can be drawn from current events. (c) Examples for 
analysis should be drawn from more than one cultural context. 
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   (a) When using CDA, the first step is to examine stereotypes and other representations. Take the representation 
of “Kurd people hold on to Kurdish.” What makes this a stereotype is that it is impervious to scientific 
argumentation.  We can see the Kurd people in Tehran are shifting to Persian monolinguals by the third 
generation. Nevertheless, despite overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary, the stereotype that Kurd 
people refuse to learn or speak Persian is widespread, as in Huntington’s book, and this stereotype is the basis for 
many policies, practices, and laws at any level of society. Such stereotypes are ethnocentric if they support the 
political, economic, and social power of Persian speakers and if they limit the power of Kurd people. For 
example, a widely adopted educational practice in the United States is to test Spanish-speaking children in 
subjects such as social studies and history in English only. A major rationale for this practice is that students 
must be encouraged to use English. Because the students are not given the opportunity to display their 
knowledge in these subjects in a language they know, they continue to be categorized as low achievers, and they 
are tracked into vocational education, special education, and low-achiever classrooms at a higher rate than they 
would be if their knowledge were assessed in Spanish-language tests (see Neuman & Dickinson, 2001). Thus a 
stereotype about Kurd people will be the foundation for an educational practice if that marginalizes Kurd 
children in Tehran. In van Dijk’s terms, therefore, this educational practice is ethnocentric. Class discussion can 
focus on the connections between ethnic stereotypes and public policy, law, and practice, and on students’ views 
about ethnic discrimination as a system of social dominance. 
    (b) A second way to use CDA is to focus on elite discourse of current events. How is ethnicity represented in 
public discourse about current events?  Imagine a situation in which two persons from different ethnic 
background (e.g. Fars and Kurd) want to take part in an election for being president of country. Perusing the 
votes, we’ll come to this conclusion that most of the Kurdish voters voted to the Kurdish candidate. This 
example raises the issue of “reverse ethnicism,” or ethnic discrimination among ethnic minorities. Implicit in the 
concept of “reverse ethnicism” is an understanding of ethnic discrimination as a set of beliefs about ethnic 
preferences which can be held by any ethnic group. Moreover, reverse ethnicism is often linked discursively 
with the idealized notion that ending ethnic discrimination means creating an “ethnic blind” society. (That is, 
ethnic equality means a total disregard of ethnicity, an idea that often appears in anti-affirmative action 
discourse.) What is lacking in this discourse of ethnicity is the CDA focus on power: The issue is not merely 
whether race or ethnicity is a motivation for actions such as voting for a particular candidate. In van Dijk’s 
terms, voting for Obama because he is black is not the same act as voting against him because he is black. Only 
the second action sustains an unequal social hierarchy of white privilege. Indeed, within the framework of CDA, 
“reverse ethnicism” is a non-sequitur, and an “ethnic blind” society is an unattainable ideal that serves to 
maintain existing social hierarchies and to discourage active measures to rectify social inequality. 
   (c) A third principle is that CDA in the classroom should focus on discourse samples drawn from different 
cultural contexts. The inequality in the occurrence of different cultural contexts induces ethnic discrimination. 
When all of the texts, which a student with Lori ethnic background reads, are about Fars ethnic group and he 
finds nothing about his ethnic group in school books, the ethnic discrimination will be induced.       
 
         7. Conclusion 
   Given the challenges of talking about ethnicity, adopting a scientific approach that focuses on empirical 
evidence and scientific investigation is appealing, particularly if it leads to the reassuring and “politically 
correct” conclusion that “ethnicity does not exist” and ethnic discrimination is therefore unreasonable and 
wrong. Yet if we claim that ethnicity does not exist, how do we engage with the powerful everyday experiences 
of ethnicism that are so fundamental to many people’s lives? How can we address ethnicism if we discard the 
concept of ethnicity? One possibility is to declare that ethnicism is largely a thing of the past, and that people 
who claim to experience ethnic discrimination are being overly sensitive. CDA offers a framework for analyzing 
this possibility by raising questions such as: On what basis can Fars students make statements about the 
experiences of Kurd students? Who decides whether a claim about one’s experience is legitimate? What are the 
social consequences of Fars students’ belief that they can judge the psychological “sensitivity” of Kurd students 
(or other ethnic minorities) they do not know? Most importantly, who benefits from this point of view? In 
seeking answers to such questions, we can apply critical thinking to our own discourses of ethnicity. 
   In discussions of ethnicity and in the educational effort to counter ethnicism, what truly matters is not what 
science says, nor whether people can be educated to not care about ethnicity. To stop talking or thinking in 
ethnocentric terms is not the same as achieving ethnic equality. Indeed, it is possible to create an “ethnic blind” 
discourse that sustains and reproduces ethnic inequality. In such a case, probing the content of the discourse in 
search of ethnic stereotypes would not be enough. We must also look critically at what the discourse does in the 
society, and, in turn, what we ourselves do by subscribing to such discourse. 
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